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The Fuller Court and State Criminal Process: 
Threshold of Modern Limitations on Government 
William F. Duker* 
The Fuller Court is notorious for its judicial activism. Mere 
citation of Lochner v. New Yorkl by judicial conservatives2 is 
sufficient to embarrass defenders of Warren Court activi~m.~ 
Elsewhere I have examined the Fuller Court's "liberty of con- 
tract" cases and have argued that the decisions in those cases- 
were dictated by a master idea of individual liberty which, in the 
Court's view, superseded paternalistic legislation designed to 
remedy the social problems of the corporate revolution.' Social 
legislation that discriminated among classes was pregumptively 
void. However, this position was sharply contrasted by the posi- 
tion taken in criminal cases coming from the state courts. In this 
latter area, the Fuller Court's posture was a model of self- 
restraint. 
One way to relax the tension between the two sets of cases 
is to suggest that the Court was representing the interests of the 
elite: legislation attempting to ameliorate the unequal bargain- 
ing power between employer and employee was commonly 
struck down; legislation providing swift justice for the criminal 
defendant was upheld. It thus could be argued that the Court 
was motivated simply by a desire to protect private property. 
Such a conclusion, however, fails to take account of the Court's 
vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws. The better conclu- 
sion is based on the Court's perception of historically proper leg- 
islative activity. The "liberty of contract" decisions were a re- 
* B.A., 1976, State Univ. of New York at Albany; Ph.D, 1978, University of 
Cambridge. 
1. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
2. Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 15 
(1978). 
3. See generally Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979). 
See also Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestions for the Revival of Substantive Due 
Process, 1975 S.  CT. REV. 261, 277 (1976). 
4. Duker, Mr. Justice Rufus W. Peckham: The Police Power and the Individual in 
a Changing World, 1980 B.Y.U. L. REV. 47. 
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sponse to a new brand of legislation, one attempting a degree of 
marketplace regulation never before undertaken. Although the 
Court was willing to allow government to check the growth of 
artificial monopolies, which, like big government, threatened in- 
dividual liberty, it otherwise refused to allow government re- 
strictions upon individual liberty of contract. On the other hand, 
the legislative role in the criminal justice system was well estab- 
lished, and as long as state criminal process was applied equally, 
the Supreme Court refused to allow federal court intervention. 
I t  is true that this application of federalism and equal treat- 
ment, like the application of all "neutral" principles, was not 
truly neutral, but this should not cast a shadow on the motives 
of the Court. Its conception of the judicial role, like that of the 
Warren and Burger Courts, was merely a reflection of its under- 
standing of contemporary constitutional and normative values. 
Because it is the value system of another day that reaches 
back to examine Lochner and the Fuller Court decisions in race- 
related and criminal law cases, it may be felt that the present- 
day debate over the rightful place of courts is not helped by in- 
voking the Fuller legacy. However, the Fuller Court era occupied 
a critical moment in American constitutional history-a moment 
at the threshold of modern constitutional government-and un- 
derstanding how that Court ensured limited government is es- 
sential to understanding the origin of modern limitations on 
government and the normative values that those limitations 
reflect. 
State criminal cases have been selected for study because 
they lie at the interface of federalism and process-the former 
providing the primary means of ensuring individual liberty for 
those who framed the Constitution; the latter providing the pri- 
mary means of ensuring individual liberty today. This Article 
begins by exploring the foundations of Fuller Court federalism 
and process. It turns next to selected clusters of state criminal 
cases involving claims of systematic exclusion, cruel and unusual 
punishment, and self-in~rimination.~ 
5. Other types of claims considered by the Fuller Court will not be given textual 
treatment for various reasons. Although the Court did decide cases dealing with double 
jeopardy, see Brantley v. Georgia, 217 U.S. 284 (1910); Keerl v. Montana, 213 U.S. 135 
(1909); Bassing v. Cady, 208 U.S. 386 (1908); Schoener v. Pennsylvania, 207 U.S. 188 
(1907); Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71 (1902); New York v. Eno, 155 U.S. 89 (1894), and 
with violations of guarantees against unlawful seizure, see Consolidated Rendering Co. v. 
Vermont, 207 U.S. 541 (1908); Adam v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904); Miller v. Texas, 
153 U.S. 535 (1894), it managed to avoid direct confrontation with the question of the 
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The Founding Fathers envisioned state courts as the pri- 
mary protectors of individual liberty and the primary agencies of 
criminal justice.. The habeas corpus clause of the Constitution, 
for instance, was intended to restrict Congress from suspending 
state habeas corpus for federal prisoners, and the first habeas 
statute specifically denied federal habeas corpus jurisdiction in 
state cases.' Federal entry into the affairs of state criminal pro- 
cess was narrow. The Bill of Rights, as Chief Justice Marshall 
observed in Barron v. Baltimore,. was meant to restrict the ac- 
tivities of only the federal government. The Marshall Court did 
much to ensure the supremacy of the federal courts where their 
power was challenged: but it was not until the chief justiceship 
of Roger B. Taneylo that the supremacy of the federal judiciary 
was dramatically displayed. The national protection that the 
Taney Court lent to slavery-the "peculiar institu- 
tiod9-completed the transformation of the habeas corpus 
clause of the Constitution. From that time forth, the clause 
would be interpreted to guarantee federal habeas corpus and the 
state courts would be denied power to issue writs of habeas 
applicability of those federal constitutional provisions to the states. Both types of cases 
do provide additional illustration of the Court's unwillingness to interfere with state 
criminal process, but add little to that found in the examples to be examined. Similarly, 
cases challenging a state's failure to allow a defendant to confront witnesses, see West v. 
Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1904); Murray v. Louisiana, 163 U.S. 101 (1896), and failure to 
grant a defendant a right of appeal, see Rogers v. Peck, 199 U.S. 425 (1905); Allen v. 
Georgia, 166 US. 138 (1897); Kohl v. Lehlback, 160 U.S. 293 (1895); McKane v. Durston, 
153 U.S. 684 (1894); Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314 (1892); Fielden v. Illinois, 143 U.S. 
452 (1892); Schwab v. Berggren, 143 U.S. 442 (1892), contain language expressing the 
Court's unwillingness to intervene in state criminal process, but again add little to lan- 
guage used in the cases to be treated. 
During the Fuller era, the Court also refused to interfere with state contempt pro- 
ceedings irrespective of the individual right asserted, see Consolidated Rendering Co. v. 
Vermont, 207 U.S. 541 (1908) (self-incrimination); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 
(1907) (freedom of press); Eilenbecker v. District Court of Plymouth Co., 134 U.S. 31 
(1890) (trial by jury), but since courts traditionally have been reluctant to interfere with 
the efforts of another court to vindicate its dignity and authority, federalism and process 
explanations for the decisions may be suspect. 
6. See Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An 
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Hmv. L. REV. 1362, 1401 (1953). 
7. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 5 14, 1 Stat. 73. 
8. 32 U.S. (7 Pet)  243, 250 (1833). 
9. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
10. Justice Taney was, ironically, an ardent supporter of states' rights. 
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corpus for federal prisoners.ll 
The Civil War had a tremendous symbolic effect on the fed- 
eral structure, but that war did not divide states' rightists from 
non-states' rightists. Rather, it separated those who espoused 
dual federalism or states' rights from those who espoused abso- 
lute state sovereignty." While wartime measures previewed 
modern nationalism,lS commitment to states' rights remained 
strong. The fourteenth amendment, which has had such a . 
profound effect on modern constitutional adjudication, had little 
impact during the years immediately following its incorporation. 
In the Slaughter-House Cases," the Court practically read the 
"privileges and immunities" clause out of the amendment by 
holding that the only privileges and immunities secured equally 
to all were those that arose out of the nature and essential char- 
acter of the national government. Justice Miller's reading in 
that case was influenced by his refusal to believe that the pur- 
pose of the fourteenth amendment was to transfer the protection 
of all civil rights from the states to the federal government. If 
this were so, "Congress . . . [could] also pass laws . . . limiting 
and restricting the exercise of legislative power by the States, in 
their moat ordinary and usual functions," and the Supreme 
Court would be "a perpetual censor upon all legislation of the 
States, on the civil rights of their own citizens, with authority to 
nullify such as it did not approve as consistent with those 
rights."16 
The first substantial test for the "due process" clause of the 
fourteenth amendment came in Hurtado v. California.16 As per- 
mitted by the California constitution, Hurtado had been brought 
to trial for murder on an information after examination and 
commitment by a magistrate. On writ of error to the state su- 
preme court, which had aflirmed his conviction, Hurtado re- 
quested the United States Supreme Court to overturn the state 
court decision because he had not been indicted by a grand jkuy. 
After examination of English legal history, the Court found that 
indictment by a grand jury was not part of the settled usages 
11. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858). 
12. Benedict, Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction and the Waite Court, 1978 S.  
CT. REV. 39, 45. 
13. Benedict, Contagion and the Constitution: Quarantine Agitation from 1859 to 
1866, 25 J. HIST. MED. AND ALLIED SCI. 177 (1970). 
14. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). 
15. Id. at 78. 
16. 110 US. 516 (1884). 
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and modes of proceeding of English common law. Even if it 
were, reasoned the Court, it would be unwise for states to be 
bound by any fixed set of criminal procedure. In addition, it ob- 
served that the fifth amendment, which secured due process at  
the federal level, provided separately for indictment by a grand 
jury. Since "due process" meant the same thing in both the fifth 
and the fourteenth amendments, and since no part of the Con- 
stitution was superfluous, the Court concluded that due process 
did not of itself require indictment by a grand jury. 
The concept of equality before the law thus took on more 
than just the meaning of the equal protection clause:17 it in- 
cluded the interpretation of privileges and immunities after 
Slaughter-House and the idea of due process after Hurtado. 
Against this background, substantive due process was a natural 
development. The Fuller Court took one step back from the 
clauses of the fourteenth amendment and required that legisla- 
tures assume a neutral position in the enactment of legislation. 
The concept of federalism restraining the fourteenth 
amendment was afErmed shortly after Hurtado. In 1868 the Su- 
preme Court's power under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 had 
been revoked by the Radical Republican Congress because of an 
unreasonable fear that the Court was about to declare the Re- 
construction program unconstitutional.18 The significance of this 
1868 revocation with respect to state criminal cases was that the 
lower federal courts were left to interpret the Habeas Corpus 
Act of 1867 without the guidance of the Supreme Court, and 
these courts were not reluctant to use their power to the fullest 
extent. For example, in the early 1880's, in a number of cases 
involving discrimination by Pacific coast states and municipali- 
ties against immigrant Chinese, the federal courts released 
habeas corpus applicants prior to trial or immediately following 
convictions on the ground that the state statute or ordinance 
was unconstitutional. The courts were no less hesitant to over- 
turn decisions of states' highest courts. This ready interference 
with state judicial systems was not well received by the legal 
community, and congressional action was requested. The request 
was answered in 1885 in the form of a rescission of the 1868 
17. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
18. See generally S. KUTLER, JUDICIAL POWER AND RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS (1968). 
Ex parte McCardle, 74 US. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868), was pending before the Court at the 
time. 
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measure; the Supreme Court's jurisdiction was restored,'@ al- 
though accompanied by a mandate that federal interference in 
state criminal proceedings be limited.20 The Supreme Court had 
no difficulty understanding the congressional intent and almost 
immediately responded with the exhaustion doctrine in Ex parte 
R~yal l .~ l  Under that doctrine federal habeas corpus jurisdiction 
was to be guided by a principle of comity and, except in "special 
circumstances," not to be invoked until state remedies were 
exhausted. 
Federalism is an instrumental concept. In the formative era 
of the Republic, federalism was deemed necessary to safeguard 
individual liberty. Suspicion of centralized government survived 
the transformation from confederation to federal union, and was 
evidenced, as noted above, in the habeas corpus clause. To effec- 
tuate the Compromise of 1850 and the Fugitive Slave Act there 
was an upsurge of national power before the Civil War. The na- 
tionalism of the Civil War itself was designed to save and not to 
destroy the federal structure. The Supreme Court's jurisdiction 
under the 1867 Act was revoked by Congress only to secure its 
Reconstruction program. The 1885 measure evidenced in turn a 
recognition that Reconstruction was long over and that the left- 
over legislation was producing undesirable effects. Federal inter- 
ference with state criminal process was unwelcome; the availa- 
bility of such interference as a means for frustrating swift justice 
was inconsistent with general attitudes toward criminal 
law-attitudes that stressed crime repression, not due process.22 
Although vigilantism had enjoyed a long history in America? 
the late nineteenth century witnessed a notable surge in this 
form of extra-legal violence. These energetic acts of "public 
spirit" naturally had a feedback effect on the criminal justice 
system. The legal community in fact reacted by attempting "to 
bring the regular system of law and order closer to the spirit and 
practice of ~igilantisrn."~~ Even while lawmakers sought to dis- 
19. Act of March 3, 1885, ch. 353, 23 Stat. 437. 
20. H.R. REP. NO. 730, 48th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1884). 
21. 117 U.S. 241 (1886). 
22. Brown, Legal and Behavioral Perspectives on American Vigilantism, in LAW m 
AMERICAN HISTORY 95 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn eds. 1971). 
23. Brown, Historical Patterns of Violence in America, in 1 VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: 
HISTORICAL ND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 35 (H. Graham & T. Gurr eds. 1969); Brown, 
The American Vigilante Tradition, in 1 VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL ND COMPAR- 
ATIVE PERSPECTIVES 121 (H. Graham & T. Gurr eds., 1969). 
24. Brown, supra note 22, at 106. 
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suade local officials from cooperating with lynchers by drafting 
statutes that imposed fines and created means of removing of- 
fending officials from office, legal scholars, such as Charles J. Bo- 
naparte, argued that the remedy for lynching lay in making the 
criminal law more effective and realistic. Bonaparte distin- 
guished "lynch law" from "mere disorder": the former was 
meant "not to violate, but to vindicate, the law; or, to speak 
more accurately, the law is violated in form that it may be vindi- 
cated in substance, its 'adjective' part (i.e., matter of procedure) 
is disregarded that its 'substantive' part may be preserved?' To 
effectuate his goal, Bonaparte suggested that the number of cap- 
ital crimes be increased, that grand juries be abolished, that the 
right of preemptory challenge be eliminated, that the double 
jeopardy guarantee be abrogated, that trials be accelerated, and 
that the executive be stripped of power to pardon." Others en- 
dorsed parts of his remedy.27 Some, such as Supreme Court Jus- 
tice David J. Brewer, suggested that the right of appeal be abol- 
i ~ h e d . ~ ~  Simeon Baldwin advocated whipping and castration as 
punishments for crime.2@ This general attitude was reflected in 
many state criminal statutes and the congressional decision to 
revoke the 1868 measure. The judicial response to the congres- 
sional revocation decision acknowledged the legitimacy of such 
statutes. 
The neutral principles that directed the decisions of the 
Fuller Court in state criminal cases thus had been formulated 
before the Court took its place in history, and the focus now 
shifts to that Court's application of those principles. Cases chal- 
lenging the composition of state grand and petit juries were de- 
termined not by racist predispositions of the individual judges, 
but by established concepts of federalism and equal- 
ity-concepts which also determined the disposition of cruel and 
unusual punishment and self-incrimination challenges. 
25. Bonaparte, Lynch Law and Its Remedy, 8 YALE L.J. 335, 336 (1899). 
26. Id. at 342. 
27. See generally Brown, supra note 22. 
28. Brewer, The Right of Appeal, 55 INDEPENDENT 2547 (1903). 
29. Baldwin, Whipping and Castration As Punishments for Crime, 8 YALE L.J. 371 
(1899); Baldwin, The Restoration of Whipping as a Punishment For Crime, 13 GREEN 
BAG 65 (1901). 
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In an otherwise brilliant article, Michael Les Benedict ar- 
gued that the modern criticism of the Supreme Court under 
Chief Justice Morrison Waite has failed "to distinguish the posi- 
tion of the Waite Court from its successors, accepting, for in- 
stance, the reactionary decisions of the Fuller Court in civil 
rights cases as logical extensions of the Waite Court doctrines, 
which they were not.'"O In all fairness, Professor Benedict was 
examining only the. Waite Court's posture toward federalism and 
not the decisions of the Fuller Court. Had those decisions been 
examined, Professor Benedict would have found that they were 
indeed logical extensions of the Waite Court doctrines. The 
master ideas applied by the Fuller Court in civil rights cases fol- 
lowed directly from Slaughter-House and Hurtado. But, Profes- 
sor Benedict might ask, if substantive due process grew natu- 
rally from the equality principle at work in Slaughter-House 
and Hurtado-a principle that rejected government interference 
with the liberty of the individual and condemned legislation that 
discriminated among classes-how could the Fuller Court up- 
hold "Jim Crow" legislation that provided for separate coaches 
for black and white railway passengers? The answer is that the 
relationship between liberty and equality is a complicated one. 
It is apparent to a people schooled in a class presided over by 
the Warren Court that equal treatment for all often means lib- 
erty for only some. However, the individual liberty secured by 
substantive due process during the Fuller Court era was not 
equality of outcome, but equality of treatment before the law 
and equality of opportunity, both of which were thought to be 
attainable if legislation favored no particular class and artificial 
monopolies were ab~l ished.~~ The majority in Plessy u. Fergu- 
son? for example, asserted that a "statute which implies merely 
a legal distinction . . . has no tendency to destroy the legal 
equality of the two races."ss The statute involved was thus 
viewed as effecting merely a legal distinction, rather than as a 
breach of equality before the lawY The judicial activism of the 
30. Benedict, supra note 12, at 40. 
31. Duker, supra note 4.  
32. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
33. Id. at 543. 
34. Id. at 551. 
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Fuller Court was designed to keep government in check, and the 
petitioner in Plessy was requesting the Court to go not only 
where government ought not, but where it could not go. Al- 
though the statute in question was enacted only six years earlier, 
it was viewed as affirming the natural order, and judicial inter- 
vention was viewed as unwelcome governmental interference. In 
the Court's view, government was simply powerless to eradicate 
racial prejudice. 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to examine the Plessy 
line of cases. It suffices to say that they rested comfortably on 
the foundation laid by the Waite Court. However, another series 
of race-related cases-involving the charge of systematic exclu- 
sion of blacks from grand and petit juries-is directly relevant. 
Like Plessy, the decisions in these cases were not guided by ra- 
cial prejudice but by the "neutral principles" of federalism and 
equality arising from an interaction of social forces-forces that 
undoubtedly, but only incidentally, included racist elements. 
The general rule adopted by the Court was one of refusing to 
allow state prisoners alleging systematic exclusion to bypass the 
normal state appellate process via federal habeas corpus or 
removal. 
In  re Wood,S5 for example, brought to the Supreme Court 
an appeal of a denial of a writ of habeas corpus by the United 
States Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York. The 
appellant contended that he had been indicted and convicted in 
the state court by juries from which blacks had been specifically 
excluded because of their race. Because he was without counsel 
and even means of procuring counsel, the appellant had pleaded 
guilty to the indictment and had failed at trial to challenge the 
exclusion of blacks from the jury. Motion for a new trial and 
petition for a writ of certiorari to the state appellate court were 
unsuccessful. 
Justice Harlan, for the Court, affirmed the denial, finding 
that "such exclusion was not required by the laws" of the 
state." As to whether blacks were excluded de facto was a ques- 
tion that the trial court was competent to decide, and its deter- 
mination could not be revised by the United States Circuit 
Court without making habeas corpus serve the purpose of a writ 
of error. The question on habeas corpus was limited to whether 
35. 140 U.S. 278 (1891). 
36. Id. at 283 (emphasis added). 
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the trial court had jurisdiction of the matter and of the person. 
Therefore, even if the challenge had been made during trial and 
erroneously determined, "such error in decision would not have 
made the judgment of conviction void, or his detention under it 
illegal."s7 The proper remedy, observed Harlan, would be to seek 
out a writ of error to the highest court of the state having juris- 
diction of the matter. The issuance of a writ of error, a nondis- 
cretionary writ, far from being seen as an intrusion into the 
state's process of law:8 was actually considered part of the 
state's appellate structure. Unlike proceeding by habeas corpus, 
the procedure outlined by Harlan avoided the possibility of a 
decision of the highest court of a state being overturned by the 
lowliest federal tribunal-an irritant that played a major role in 
the decision to return the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under 
the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867.s9 
In Andrews v.  swart^,^^ Justice Harlan again wrote for the 
Court and again affirmed the denial of habeas corpus to a black 
applicant challenging the exclusion of members of his race from 
grand and petit juries. In this case, however, the appellant had 
called the trial court's attention to the discriminatory manner of 
jury selection and had moved that the court take testimony to 
prove his allegation, but the court denied his motion and refused 
to hear testimony. The appellant noted in his habeas corpus pe- 
tition that an appeal to the state appellate court, as suggested in 
Wood, would be useless because under state law writs of error in 
37. Id. at 287. In anticipation of the Court's decision, the appellant had argued that 
under state statute and common law he was not permitted to challenge the composition 
of a jury; therefore, the trial court had no jurisdiction. Harlan conceded that the state 
code of criminal procedure did not permit the defendant to challenge the composition of 
a grand jury, but he would not exclude the possibility that the state court might allow a 
seasonably made challenge when the defect deprived the tribunal of the character of a 
grand jury in a constitutional sense. Id. at 288. 
38. See In re Frederich, 149 U.S. 70 (1893). 
39. Justice Harlan's opinion was joined by all the Justices but Gray, who was not 
present at the argument and who took no part in the decision, and Field, who filed a 
separate concurring opinion. As he had done in Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 405-09 
(1880), Field denied that there was anything in the Civil War Amendments that required 
-% 
that blacks be summoned on grand or petit juries in order to secure persons of their race 
justice and equality in the administration of the law. Even if the issue had been more 
correctly framed in terms of whether the constitutional amendment allowed blacks to be 
excluded even de facto from the possibility of serving as jurors solely because of their 
race, Field apparently would have remained unmoved. As he saw it, the manner of jury 
selection was entirely a matter of state regulation. See In re Wood, 140 U.S. at 370-71 
(Field, J., concurring). 
40. 156 U.S. 272 (1895). 
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capital cases were writs of grace rather than writs of right. In 
response to the first contention, Justice Harlan once more ob- 
served that the only issue cognizable on habeas was jurisdiction. 
As to the second contention, he noted the rule of McKane v. 
D~rs ton ,~ l  which held that appellate review was not a sine qua 
non of due process. Even if the writ of error were denied by the 
state appellate court-a possibility which Harlan would not an- 
ticipate-the proper remedy was still to carry the case to the 
highest court of the state having jurisdiction, thence to the Su- 
preme Court on writ or error. 
Removal proved no more successful in such cases than 
habeas corpus. In Gibson v. Mississippi," the plaintiff in error, a 
black charged with the murder of a white, sought removal to the 
federal circuit court on the grounds that the subordinate officers 
charged with gathering juries excluded blacks solely because of 
their race and that the laws regulating jury selection were in this 
case ex post facto. Though his contention indicated de facto 
rather than de jure discrimination, Gibson attempted to avoid 
the holding of In re Wood that such a problem was within the 
competency of the state courts by arguing that the very distinc- 
tion between de facto and de jure discrimination violated the 
spirit of the fourteenth amendment: 
Such a State through its people in its organic law, or Legisla- 
ture, may enact the finest kind of laws, and spread them upon 
its constitution or statutes, merely to avoid Federal interfer- 
ence; and yet permit its officers (who are of the white race, the 
dominant race) to try white persons touching their life, liberty 
and property, strictly in accordance with the laws of the State, 
and try negroes touching their same interests contrary to the 
laws; thus accomplishing in an indirect manner the very depri- 
vation which the people of the United States sought to prohibit 
by the enactment of the Fourteenth An~endment.'~ 
But Justice Harlan would not predict the ultimate actions of the 
state courts. Through his opinion the Court held that the re- 
moval statutes did not embrace those cases where a right was 
denied by judicial action or, as in this case, by actions of 
subordinate officers of the trial court charged with gathering a 
jury. The Court considered removal an appropriate remedy only 
41. 153 U.S. 684 (1894). 
42. 162 U.S. 565 (1896). 
43. Id. at 575. 
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where the state constitution or laws deprived one of some funda- 
mental right guaranteed other citizens of the state. Relief in 
other instances was available on appeal?* 
In Murray v. L ~ u i s i a n a , ~ ~  the Supreme Court, in an opinion 
by Justice Shiras, upheld a state supreme court's affirmance of a 
trial court's disregard of a petition by the accused to have the 
case removed to federal circuit court upon an allegation that 
blacks were excluded from serving on grand or petit juries. The 
Court simply cited Gibson and noted that the removal request 
complained of acts of the jury commissioners rather than dis- 
crimination in state law. Argument that it was the law regulating 
jury selection that violated the fourteenth amendment, because 
it conferred upon jury commissioners judicial power by allowing 
them to select jurors, was also rejected. The Court observed that 
the accused was subject to treatment no different than that 
given others, including white citizens; therefore, no federal ques- 
tion was presented. 
The procedure that the Court had been defining as the 
proper remedy was finally followed in Carter v. Texas.46 There 
the Court reversed and remanded the case of a black who had 
challenged the exclusion of members of his race from the grand 
jury. When the case was called for trial, the defendant Carter, in 
open court and before arraignment and pleading to the indict- 
ment, unsuccessfully moved to quash the indictment. The trial 
proceeded and Carter was found guilty. Carter then tendered a 
bill of exceptions asking leave to introduce evidence to prove the 
allegation, but the trial court refused to hear any evidence. The 
state appellate court affirmed the trial court's refusal to quash 
the indictment because the challenge to the composition of the 
44. It  was not clear to Justice Harlan that the record actually presented an ex post 
facto question. Nevertheless, because human life was involved, because the defendant 
had pleaded not guilty, and because the state attorney general had discussed the ques- 
tion without disputing the Supreme Court's authority to pass on it, the Court decided to 
examine the allegation. It  noted that the only difference between the applied Code of 
1892, which took effect after the date of the charged murder, and the Code of 1880, in 
force a t  the time of the alleged murder, was the requirement that persons selected for 
jury service should possess good intelligence, sound judgment, and fair character. This 
difference, observed Justice Harlan, did not affect "in any degree the substantial rights 
of those who had committed crime prior to its going into effect." Id. at 589. It  did not 
make criminal any act innocent when committed, provide for greater punishment than 
the law in force during the commission of the crime, or alter the rules of evidence. 
Rather, the change "related simply to procedure." Id. at 590. 
45. 163 U.S. 101 (1896). 
46. 177 U.S. 442 (1900). 
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grand jury, made after the indictment was found, had come too 
late. The state appellate court in fact later abandoned that ra- 
tionale and instead observed that the contention was merely a 
tender of the issue without evidence in support. The case then 
went to the United States Supreme Court on writ of error. 
For the Court, Justice Gray observed that Carter was never 
given an opportunity to challenge the grand jury that found the 
indictment against him. He noted that the grand jury had been 
impaneled prior to the time of the offense for which the defen- 
dant had been indicted, and that the defendant thus had been 
denied the equal treatment of the laws: 
Whenever by any action of a State, whether through its legisla- 
ture, through its courts, or through its executive or administra- 
tive officers, all persons of the African race are excluded, solely 
because of their race or color, from serving as grand jurors in 
the criminal prosecution of a person of the African race, the 
equal protection of the laws is denied to him, contrary to the 
Fourteenth Amendment . . . . 47 
Unlike the earlier cases, Carter involved only minimal inter- 
ference with state criminal process. It also satisfied the Court- 
established rule that if the Supreme Court directly interfered 
with state process, it would do so only after regular state chan- 
nels had been exhausted.48 
In an era when lynchings outpaced legal executions and 
when those interested in reversing that trend were suggesting an 
increase in the number of crimes labeled capital, the Court never 
entertained the challenge that capital punishment per se was 
47. Id. at 447. 
48. Where race was not a factor in challenges to jury composition, the Court likewise 
refused to interfere. The exclusion of a juror because he was not a freeholder, Leeper v. 
Texas, 139 U.S. 462 (1891), or because he had formed an opinion on the merits of the 
case, Howard v. Kentucky, 200 US. 164 (1906), or the failure to exclude an alien, Kohl v. 
Lehlback, 160 U.S. 293 (1895), did not deprive one of due process, since treatment before 
the law was not unequal, and so did not present questions that the state courts could not 
conclusively decide. Additionally, selection of a jury according to statutory provisions for 
a struck jury was held not to be a deprivation of fundamental rights. Brown v. New 
Jersey, 175 U.S. 172 (1899). Finally, in Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S. 638 (1906), the Court 
rejected a request to overturn the conviction of an individual who had been indicted by a 
grand jury constituted under rules excluding certain professional groups. Justice Holmes 
observed that the exclusion was not based upon race and was a common practice, i.e. 
equal treatment had been afforded. 
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cruel and unusual. However cruel, capital punishment was cer- 
tainly not unusual. But the era did witness the invention and 
employment of a novel means of execution, the electric chair, 
which as a statutorily authorized tool was challenged as cruel 
and unusual in In re Kemrnler.'. The New York State Legisla- 
ture enacted the capital punishment statute at issue in Kemmler 
in 1888-to take effect the next year-in response to the 1885 
annual message of the governor asking the legislature to replace 
death by hanging with a "less barbarous manner" of execution. 
However unusual, electrocution was viewed as less cruel by the 
democratic branches. 
Kemmler came to the Supreme Court after state appellate 
and collateral remedies had been exhausted. It  was aruged that 
the state statute violated the due process and privileges and im- 
munities clauses of the fourteenth amendment. The Court re- 
jected the argument, noting that the fourteenth amendment had 
not been designed to radically alter the relationship between the 
federal and state governments and that the states, not the fed- 
eral government, were the primary protectors of life, liberty, and 
property. 
[Tlhe amendment forbids any arbitrary deprivation of life, lib- 
erty, or property, and secures equal protection to all under like 
circumstances in the enjoyment of their rights; and, in the ad- 
ministration of criminal justice, requires that no different or 
higher punishment shall be imposed upon one than is imposed 
upon all for like offences. But it was not designed to interfere 
with the power of the State to protect the lives, liberties and 
property of its citizens, and to promote their health, peace, 
morals, education and good orderP 
The Court could have relied solely on this understanding of fed- 
eralism and thereby avoided defining "cruel and unusual," but it 
did not. It stated in dicta that punishments were cruel only 
when they involved torture or lingering death, and that capital 
punishment itself was not cruelF Shortly afterwards, Kemmler 
became the first person to be executed by electrocution. 
Earlier that year, the Court in in re Medley62 had examined 
a capital punishment statute and determined that its solitary 
49. 136 U.S. 436 (law). 
50. Id. at 448-49 (footnote omitted). 
51. Id. at 447. 
52. 134 U.S. 160 (1890). 
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confinement provision made it  ex post facto because it imposed 
an additional punishment. Although in striking down the statute 
the Court relied exclusively on this identified ex post facto fea- 
ture, Justice Miller took the occasion to trace the history of soli- 
tary confinement in an examination which revealed its inhuman- 
ity. He concluded his survey by noting the preamble of 25 
George 2, c. 37, which termed solitary confinement "a further 
terror and peculiar mark of infamy," and 6 & 7 William 4, c. 30, 
which abolished solitary confinement in England in response to 
a revolt of public opinion. A challenge similar to that raised in 
Medley was made in Holden v. Minne~ota,"~ but in that case the 
solitary confinement aspect of the state's capital punishment 
statute, enacted after the crime charged was committed, was 
found not to have been imposed." It was only in McElvaine v. 
Brushs6 that the issue of the constitutionality of solitary confine- 
ment came directly before the Court. With Justice Miller no 
longer on the Bench, the Court, speaking through Chief Justice 
Fuller, held that neither the eighth nor the fourteenth amend- 
ments prohibited the punishment under examination. The 
eighth amendment was held to operate exclusively on the federal 
government. The fourteenth amendment question was consid- 
ered settled by Kemmler and Holden-which, of course, it was 
not. 
The Fuller Court never again addressed the issue of the 
constitutionality of solitary confinement. The confinements chal- 
lenged in Rooney v. North DakotaW and Rogers v. Pecks7 were 
found to be "closed," rather than solitary, confinements, which 
the Court viewed as identical to simple confinement or custody, 
i.e., "only such custody, as will safely secure the production . . . 
of the prisoner on the day appointed for his exec~tion."~~ The 
cases thus involved no fundamental right warranting federal in- 
terference with a state in the administration of its domestic 
affairs. 
The only possible challenge remaining under the constitu- 
tional standard articulated by the Court was that the punish- 
ment imposed in an individual case was more severe than that 
53. 137 U.S. 483 (law). 
54. See also Rooney v. North Dakota, 196 U.S. 319 (1905). 
55. 142 U.S. 155 (1891). 
56. 196 U.S. 319 (1905). 
57. 199 U.S. 425 (1905). 
58. 196 U.S. at 325. 
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normally imposed-a challenge raised specifically in Howard v. 
Fleming." That case involved the conviction of three persons for 
conspiracy. One was sentenced to seven years imprisonment, the 
others to ten years. The latter two contended that they were de- 
nied the equal protection of the laws because other offenses, 
which most would consider more grievous, received a lesser pun- 
ishment. The Court's most conservative and outspoken member 
on criminal justice, Justice David Brewer, stated that "[ulndue 
leniency in one case does not transform a reasonable punish- 
ment in another case to a cruel one."60 In fact, said Brewer, if 
the sentence works to deter, the state ought to be congratulated 
and not condemned."l 
For the Fuller Court, the disposition of an individual con- 
victed of an offense against the laws of a state was a matter left 
to the state itself. The fourteenth amendment required equal 
treatment in the disposition of state convicts, but it did not 
make the eighth amendment applicable to state criminal cases. 
IV. SELF-INCRIMINATION 
The Fuller Court first heard a self-incrimination challenge 
by a state prisoner in Adarns v. New York." By admitting cer- 
tain illegally seized evidence, the trial court was charged with 
having compelled the defendant to be a witness against himself. 
The Supreme Court rejected the argument, observing that the 
accused was not compelled to take the witness stand in his own 
behalf, to testify concerning the illegally seized papers, or to 
make any admissions about them. The observation was relevant 
not because of any direct constitutional guarantee applied to the 
states, but because the laws of the state itself guaranteed the 
privilege against self-incrimination. Had it been found that Ad- 
ams was compelled to testify in violation of that privilege, the 
finding would have simply suggested a case of deprivation of 
equal treatment under the applicable New York laws. 
The challenge was next heard by the Court in Barrington u. 
M i s s o ~ r i . ~ ~  However, because the constitutional challenge had 
not been seasonably made, the Court refused to find that state- 
59. 191 U.S. 126 (1903). 
60. Id. at 136. 
61. Id. 
62. 192 US. 585 (1904). 
63. 205 U.S. 483 (1907). 
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ments made by the appellant while in the "sweatbox" of the St. 
Louis police department compelled him to be a witness against 
himself. Objection to the admission of the evidence had been 
made during trial and had been based not upon constitutional 
grounds but upon the grounds of irrelevancy, immateriality, and 
failure to lay a proper foundation. The Court observed in pass- 
ing that the fifth amendment operated only as a restriction on 
federal power. 
The question finally received full treatment in Twining v. 
New Jersey." There, at  the trial of a defendant charged with 
knowingly falsifying trust company records with intent to 
deceive examiners, the jury was instructed that it might draw 
unfavorable inferences from the defendant's failure to testify 
where it was within his power to respond to evidence that 
tended to incriminate him. It was first argued that the privileges 
and immunities clause guaranteed the exemption from self-in- 
crimination as a fundamental right of national citizenship. The 
Supreme Court, however, followed the Slaughter-Housea5 hold- 
ing and rejected this argument. The defendant then appealed to 
the fourteenth amendment's due process clause, and the Court 
gave the question extensive treatment. It set out three tests for 
determining whether the requirements of due process were satis- 
fied. The first test asked whether the exemption was a privilege 
recognized by English common or statutory law before the set- 
tlement of the American colonies and shown to be suited to colo- 
nial life? The exemption failed this test. The second test ques- 
tioned whether the exemption was a "fundamental principle of 
liberty and justice which inheres in the very idea of free govern- 
ment."@' After cautioning his brethren not to import their own 
personal views as to what was wise, just, or fitting into the Con- 
stitution, Justice Moody set out to answer the second test by 
examining early American legal history. A survey of early state 
* 
constitutional provisions and suggested amendments to the Fed- 
eral Constitution convinced Justice Moody that the exemption 
"was not conceived to be inherent in due process of law, but on 
the other hand a right separate, independent and outside of due 
64. 211 U.S. 78 (1908). 
65. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). 
66. This is an American version of the doctrine of Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377 
(K.B. 1607). 
67. 211 U.S. at 106. 
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pro~ess."~' The final test guaranteed process designed to check 
arbitrary government. The Court concluded that since the de- 
fendant was given reasonable notice and an opportunity to be 
heard, he had not been subjected to any arbitrary governmental 
power.e9 The Court concluded that even under an assumption 
that the defendant had been compelled to incriminate himself, 
no federal question was presented because the fourteenth 
amendment offered no protection from self-incrimination in 
state criminal cases. That amendment did not effect an altera- 
tion in federal-state relations: 
The power of .  . . [the] people [of the states] ought not to be 
fettered, their sense of responsibility lessened, and their capac- 
ity for sober and restrained self-government weakened by 
forced construction of the Federal Constitution. If the people 
of New Jersey are not content with the law as declared in re- 
peated decisions of their courts, the remedy is in their own 
hands.70 
Continuing the Jeffersonian tradition-a tradition enhanced 
by the teachings of Herbert Spencer-the Fuller Court endeav- 
ored to protect individual liberty by working to ensure limited 
government. National power was kept in check by a notion of 
federalism that prohibited federal interference with state law 
and process as long as each was equally applied. This concept of 
federalism and equal treatment not only explains the Fuller 
Court's passive posture toward state criminal cases, but also ac- 
counts for the Court's contrastingly vigorous and more famous 
responses to state efforts to regulate the market place by pater- 
nalistic measures. In cases where the equality required by the 
Fuller Court's understanding of the fourteenth amendment was 
violated, the normal constraints of federalism were simply 
dropped and national intervention justified and even required. 
With the nexus between the Fuller Court's understanding of 
federalism and its interpretation of equal treatment, it was natu- 
ral that the eventual success of the progressives to undermine 
substantive due process would also bring down the nineteenth 
68. Id. at 110. 
69. Id. at 111-12. 
70. Id. at 114. 
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century conception of legitimate federal-state relations. Such a 
traditional notion of federalism would only frustrate the new 
bulwarks of individual liberty-the process-oriented rights of 
the Bill of Rights. To accommodate the spirit of limited govern- 
ment that prevailed in the age of substantive due process and 
yet acknowledge the idea of social democracy that brought that 
age to an end, the Supreme Court gradually began to expand 
process-oriented rights. The expansion itself climaxed during 
the Warren era. Where the judiciary was once passive, it became 
active; where it was once active, it became passive. Substantive 
due process was turned inside out. 
The progressive program of this latter period sought to 
solve the problems of the corporate revolution with increased 
governmental intervention. Government itself grew with the cor- 
porate state. To protect individual liberty in the twentieth cen- 
tury required that the courts restructure large-scale organiza- 
tions. The injunction became a tool of social reform used to 
restructure school, police, and prison  system^;^' habeas corpus 
became an instrument to restructure the criminal justice sys- 
tems. Once again, however, substantive due process, though in 
its modern context, has come under attack. The Burger Court 
has reacted by circumscribing process and denying substantive 
claims. We appear to be at another threshold, but at this point it 
is unclear what will provide tomorrow's bulwark of individual 
liberty. 
71. See generally 0. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978). 
